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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case 
The litigation involved in this appeal is a continuation of a California lawsuit that began 
in 2009. The transactions involved here were by residents of California. In 2008, while living in 
California, Sarah Correa, the daughter of the Respondents, had embezzled $400,000.00 from the 
Appellant. In July of 2009, and unknown to the Appellant, Ms. Correa had given the 
Respondents (Ms. Correa's parents) $101,500.00 of the money so that they could purchase the 
real property located at 419 N. 19th Street, Boise, Idaho. In September of 2009, the Appellant 
sued Ms. Correa in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Placer. Respondent 
Gennieve Hill attended the trial, which was held on March 24, 2011. 
Appellant obtained judgment against Ms. Correa, which imposed a constructive trust 
upon the $400,000.00. The Respondents now contend that the money given to them by their 
daughter was a loan, not a gift, and that they had no idea that the money they were given by their 
daughter was wrongfully taken from Appellant. The Respondents claim that they made 
improvements/repairs on the property from December of 2009 through July of 2013. They 
further contend that, since they made repairs/improvements to the property, they are entitled to 
reimbursement from the Appellant. The Appellant argues that the Respondents knew, as 
March 24, 2011, that the money they used to purchase the real property was the Appellant's 
money; and that they are not entitled to reimbursement for repairs/improvements from that 
and thereafter. This appeal is taken from the district court's conclusion of law, where it 
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upon the Respondents 
"innocent recipients of a benefit" and entitling them to reimbursement from the Appellant 
Course of Proceedings 
to 
Plaintiff filed his complaint on January 2015 (R Vol. 1, p. 4 ). In the complaint the 
Plaintiff requested that the court enforce the constructive trust, which had already been 
recognized by the Court in case CV-OC-2012-21938 (R Vol. 1, p. 7), and unjust enrichment. 
Defendants answered the complaint on February 6, 2015 (R Vol. 1, p. 9). In their response, the 
Defendants admitted that they had been given the money by their daughter without consideration 
and that the money they used to purchase the subject property belonged to the Plaintiff (R Vol. 
1, p.10, L. 14-16). 
On April 6, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment (R Vol. 1, p.14). 
Respondents opposed the motion on March 24, 2015, arguing that there was a dispute of fact 
involving what the Respondents knew at the time the money was "lent" to them and when they 
made improvements to the subject property (R Vol. I, p. 45, L. 5-8). Plaintiff replied to the 
Respondent's opposition to summary judgment on May 4, 2005 (R Vol. 1, p. 49). On June 22, 
2015 the district court entered its summary judgment opinion (R Vol. 1, p. 72). Though neither 
the Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, nor the Defendants opposition to summary 
judgment, prayed for it, district court granted the following inter alia: that Sarah Correa is the 
daughter of the defendants and the ex-girlfriend the Plaintiff~ and that the subject property was 
titled in the defendants name (R Vol. 1, 73, L. 6). The district court denied the motion as 
to the issue of whether the Plaintiff would be unjustly enriched by not compensating the 
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for case was held on June 
September 14, 2015 (R Vol. 1, p. The district court ordered that title to the subject 
property, 419 N. 19th Street, Boise, Idaho, to be transferred to the Plaintiff, and an equitable 
impressed upon the property in favor of the Defendants in the amount of $33,689.08. 
was given only 180 days to pay the lien or the defendants would be allowed to foreclose on 
lien (R Vol. 1, p. 81, L. 3-6). Plaintiff filed his timely notice of appeal on October 5, 2015 (R 
Vol. 1, p. 86). 
Statement of Facts 
During the period of 2005-2009, the Appellant and the daughter of the Respondents, 
Sarah Correa, lived together with their two children in the Appellant's home. Between April 30, 
2008 and July 20, 2008, Appellant entrusted Ms. Correa with three checks totaling $400,000.00 
to hold for him. On February 9, 2009 Ms. Correa left the Appellant's home, his 
$400,000.00, and moved in with the Respondents. 
On July 7, 2009 Ms. Correa wrote two checks to her mother, Respondent Gennieve Hill, 
totaling $95,000.00. On July 26, 2009 Ms. Correa wrote two more checks to her mother, 
Respondent Gennieve Hill, totaling $6,500.00. The four checks written by Ms. Correa to 
Respondent Gennieve Hill totaled $101,500.00; of which consisted solely of the Appellant's 
money. Despite numerous requests to return money, which were ignored Ms. 
Appellant was forced to file suit on September 24, 2009 in the Superior Court 
County of Placer (Case Number 
$400,000.00. 
8 
to recover 
Tne $101,500.00 the Respondents from the 
Respondents Bank America checking account until October 7, 2009, when the Respondents 
wired $104,000.00 from that account to Yvette and Lawrence Bruce (Respondent Gennieve 
Hill's sister and brother-in-law, who resided in Boise). Twenty days later, on October 2009, 
using the money wired to her by the Respondents, Yvette Bruce obtained a cashier's check for 
$96,000.00. 
The $96,000.00 cashier's check was paid to the order of First American Title Company 
for the purchase of the real property located at 417 N 19th Street, Boise, Idaho 83702, at public 
auction for Gennieve and Frank Hill. 
Company conveyed title to said real property to Frank and Gennieve Hill. The Bruces wired 
$7,500.00 of the remaining $8,000.00 ($104,000.00 $96,000.00) back to the Hills on 10/30/09. 
On March 24, 2011, a one day trial was held for the California between the 
Appellant and Ms. Correa. Ms. Correa was represented by Counsel (Paul and Appellant 
Harrentsian represented himself. Respondent Gennieve Hill was also in ~ .. -... ~~.,,,., 
duration of the trial. On June 7, 2011 the Honorable Judge Joseph O'Flaherty entered his 
"Tentative Statement of Decision". On October 3, 2012 judgment was entered in the California 
Case in favor of Appellant Harrentsian against Ms. Correa for conversion; the Court found that 
Ms. Correa had breached her fiduciary duty to Appellant Harrentsian; and the Court placed a 
constructive trust over the $400,000.00 Ms. Correa had stolen from Appellant Harrentsian. 
In an effort to collect his judgment, on November 29, 2012 Appellant the '-'"UHJ• 
Case as a Foreign Judgment in the Fourth Judicial District Court for the State Idaho 
CV-OC-2012-21938). On 01/09/13 Ms. Correa filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy protection, a 
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an Ada 
employer, Winco Foods. Opposing Ms. Correa's attempt to discharge her debt to him, 
filed an Adversarial Proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Idaho 
13-6006-TLM) on April 6, 2013, requesting that the Court find her debt non-dischargeable. On 
August 21, 2013 Appellant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Ms. Correa's debt 
was non-dischargeable for two of the three exemptions to discharge. On November 20, 2013 the 
Honorable Judge Terry L Meyers granted Appellant's motion for summary judgment. 
Following the discharge of Ms. Correa's Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, Appellant subpoenaed 
the bank records of the Respondents as well as those of Yvette and Laurence Bruce 
OC-2012-21938). The remaining $101,500.00 was found to been from Ms. 
Correa to the Respondents and subsequently to First American Title to purchase the 419 
Street property, via Yvette Bruce. Based on these facts, on March 201 the court 
permitted the Appellant, to record a Lis Pendens against the 419 N 19th Street property. 
SCOPE OF REVIEW 
Review of the lower court's is limited to whether the ,,._.,.,, .. ,.,,., supports the 
findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. court's 
findings of fact in a court tried case will be liberally construed on uvµ'""'-
entered, in view of the trial court's role as trier It is the province of the 
acting as trier of fact to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge 
the witnesses. If 
conflicting, they 
findings of fact are based on substantial ev1oer1ce, even if 
not be overturned on court 
to determine court cmrectl 
Martin, 39 P.3d (2001) Idaho 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Did the district court err in characterizing the Respondents as "innocent 
recipients of a benefit" as recognized in the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment §65? 
B. Did the district court err failing to recognize that the Ke:sponm!n 
received notice of the underlying restitution claim when Defendant Gennieve Hill 
attended between Plaintiff Harrentsian and Sarah Correa on March 2011 
to 
Respondents by their daughter (Sarah was a loan? 
Did the ~iu,ui,~• court err finding that all of the real property 
improvements made by esp1orn1ents were completed before the ·"·""IJ'J"'-''...,H'" 
on notice that the loan they received from their daughter was made trust 
G. Did the court err the Appellant 
of judgment to satisfy the district court imposed equitable lien? 
H. Did the district court discretion in excluding 
exhibits as a sanction discovery 
ARGUMENT 
entry 
trial 
1. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED ERR BY CHARACTERIZING 
THE RESPONDENTS AS "INNOCENT RECIPIENTS OF BENEFIT" 
In 
"Defendants Hall are best characterized as innocent recipients of a benefit as recognized in 
the Restatement (Third) of Restitution §65: "If receipt of a benefit has led a recipient without 
notice to change position in such a manner that an obligation to make restitution of the original 
benefit would be inequitable to the recipient, the recipient's liability in restitution is to that extent 
reduced" (R Vol. 1, p. 79, L. 1 7-21 ). Section 65 goes on to state, however, that: "The defense of 
change of position is available only to a recipient without notice, and only to the extent that an 
obligation to make restitution would be inequitable to the recipient. The defense is therefore 
unavailable to a conscious wrongdoer or to a recipient who is primarily responsible for his own 
unjust enrichment". 
The district court's decision, therefore, hinges on whether or not the Respondents were in 
fact recipients of a benefit without notice of the facts underlying the eventual restitution claim 
and/or whether or not they were responsible for their own unjust enrichment. The subject 
property was purchased in October of 2009 and the district court found that "the improvements 
were completed in approximately May of2012" (R Vol. 1, p. 78, L. 4). If the Respondents had 
notice of the facts underlying the eventual restitution claim at any time during this period 
(October 2009 to May 2012) then, from that moment on, the Respondent's "change of position" 
defense ceases. The defense also ceases upon determination that the Respondents themselves 
are responsible for their own unjust enrichment. It is important to note that the "change of 
position" defense was never pied at any time by the Respondents, and was only introduced by 
the district court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
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A. THE DEFENDANTS WERE PUT ON NOTICE WHEN GENNIEVE HILL 
ATTENDED THE CALIFONIA CASE TRIAL ON MARCH 2011 
The District Court never identified when or how it believed the Respondent's "became 
aware that the money received by Ms. Correa from the Plaintiff was wrongfully obtained or held 
by Ms. Correa"; only that it occurred "at some point following the trial and entry of judgment in 
the California case" (R Vol. 1, p. 77, L. 16-19). However, on direct examination, when 
questioned about the California Case trial, Respondent Gennieve Hill testified: "There was no 
ruling that day. And three or four weeks later my daughter told me that she lost the case" (Tr 
Vol. 1, p. 64, L. 4-6). Additionally, on cross examination, she testified: 
Q: So you don't know if you knew about her being sued by me for $400,000.00? 
A: I knew that you were-I knew that you were suing her for $400,000.00. 
That's why-
Q: Before or after the trial? 
A: Before 
Q: Okay. So you knew that she was being sued for $400,000.00 by me, correct? 
A: Correct. 
Q: Prior to the trial in 2011, correct? 
A: Correct. 
(Tr Vol. 1, p. 100, L. 5-18) 
The district court committed error by ignoring the admission of Respondent Gennieve 
Hill as to when she had knowledge that the funds were wrongfully obtained. 
The district court goes on to state: "In this case Defendants made valuable improvements 
on the real estate that Plaintiff seeks to recover. They did so before notice of the wrongful nature 
of their daughter's acquisition of the money she loaned them. The purchase was completed and 
the improvements made before Defendants were on notice that the loan from their daughter was 
made with trust funds" (R Vol. 1, p. 80, L. 4-8). The district court found that the improvements 
were in May of (R Vol. 1, p. Therefore, 
the district court, were not put on notice until after May of 2012. Yet, in juxtaposition to the 
above finding, the district court found that Defendant Genni eve Hill had, in fact, attended 
trial in the California Case on March 24, 2011 (R Vol. 1, p. 76, 9-10). The California 
trial was held to determine whether or not Respondent's daughter, Sarah Correa, had lawfully 
obtained the $400,000.00 from the Appellant and would be permitted to keep the money. 
In Hill v. Federal Land Bank 59 Idaho 136, 141, 80 P.2d 789, 791, the Idaho Supreme 
Court held that, "whatever is notice enough to excite the attention of a man of ordinary prudence 
and prompt him to further inquiry, amounts to notice of all such facts as a reasonable 
investigation would disclose". Clearly, the district court committed error by ignoring 
Respondent Gennieve Hill's admissions that she knew, prior to the California Case trial, about 
the issues involving the money her daughter gave her, and that she knew the outcome of said trial 
three or four weeks after the California Case trial date of March 24, 2011. By their own 
admission then, the Respondents knew that there was an issue involving the money their 
daughter had obtained from the Appellant, and consequently, an issue with the money they had 
received from her, prior to the trial in the California Case and before the majority of the 
repairs/improvements were performed on the subject property. 
"Whenever a party has information or knowledge of certain extraneous facts, which of 
themselves do not amount to, nor tend to show, an actual notice, but which are sufficient to put a 
reasonably prudent man upon an inquiry respecting a conflicting interest, claim, or right, and 
circumstances are such that the inquiry, if made and followed up with reasonable care and 
diligence, would lead to a discovery of the truth, to a knowledge of the interest, claim, or right 
which really then the party is absolutely charged with a constructive notice of such 
14 
claim, or (Pomeroy's 11 
Respondent Gennieve Hill was questioned at if had asked her daughter 
Correa) why she (Ms. Correa) was being sued for $400,000.00. She testified: never 
no" (Tr Vol. 1, p. 101, 21-22). 
Despite knowing that their daughter was being sued by the Appellant over 
$400,000.00, and that the money she received from her daughter was part of that $400,000.00, 
Respondent Gennieve Hill testified that she did not inquire as to why her daughter was being 
sued. "A person has notice of facts of which the person has reason to know as a matter of 
reasonable inference, or which the person would have discovered upon appropriate inquiry. 
standard that determines the inferences to be drawn and the inquiries to be made is that a 
reasonable and prudent person whose interests would be served by obtaining the knowledge in 
question". The Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment §69(3 )( c ). "[T]he rule 
is that when, in respect to a matter in which he has a material interest, a person knowledge of 
such facts as to excite the attention of a reasonably prudent man and to put him upon guard and 
thus to incite him to inquiry, he is chargeable with notice, equivalent in law to knowledge, of all 
those further relevant facts which such inquiry, if pursued with reasonable diligence, would have 
disclosed". The Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment §69 Reporters Notef 
B. RESPONDENT GENNIEVE HILL KNEW THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAD 
NOT GIFTED THE $400,000.00 TO MS. CORREA 
On direct examination, Respondent Gennieve Hill was asked about or not Ms. 
Correa had told her that she (Ms. was holding the money for Mr. 
had obtained them wrongfully from Mr. 
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or not a it is the must 
"a manifest intent to make a gift of the property". Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace 
Irrevocable Trust, 147, Idaho 117, 126, 206 P.3d 481, 490 (2009). 
Here, the "donor" would have been the Appellant. The Appellant's uncontroverted 
testimony was that, while on the stand in the California Case trial, Appellant testified that he did 
not gift the money to Ms. Correa (Tr Vol. 1, p. 158, L. 2-8). He further testified that while on the 
stand and facing the courtroom audience, he saw that Respondent Gennieve Hill was present 
the audience for the duration of his testimony (Tr Vol. 1, p. 157, L. 19-25; 158, L. 1). 
According to Appellant (the "donor") then, there was no gift, and Respondent Gennieve Hill 
witnessed the Appellant testifying to such. 
The testimony given at trial by both the Appellant as well as Respondent Gennieve Hill 
prove that, without question, the Respondents had actual notice of the facts underlying the 
restitution claim, at the very latest, on the day of trial in the California Case, March 2011. 
And, according Idaho law, though pertaining to securities, "a person has "notice" of a fact when 
he has actual knowledge, or has received notice, of that fact, or where, from all the facts and 
circumstances known to him at the time in question, he has reason to know that it exists" 
(Section 28-1-202 (1-3) of the Idaho Uniform Commercial Code). 
C. THE RESPONDENTS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR OWN UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT 
"Where the facts permit a direct comparison of the parties' responsibilities for the 
transaction giving rise to unjust enrichment, a recipient whose responsibility exc:ee(ts that the 
of 
Restitution, 
Appellant could not have prevented Ms. from Respondents $1 
nor on 1 
property. Only the Respondents could have done so-therefore, they bear the loss. If the 
Respondents have any recourse, it is against Ms. Correa, not the Appellant. 
The Respondents, therefore, were the only party who were in a position to """'""""J" 
control as to whether or not a loss could occur; or, if a loss occurred, the amount of the loss. 
"Notice on the part of the recipient precludes resort to the change of position defense, because 
the recipient who acts with notice of the claimant's rights is in a better position than the claimant 
to avoid the loss that must later be allocated" (Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment, §65). Any and all improvements made by the Respondents after the California Case 
trial, if not before, were done with the knowledge that the real "'"~'""-" at 419 N. 19th Street had 
been purchased with the Appellant's money. 
D. APPELLANT IS NOT UNJUSTLY ENRICHED 
The district court mischaracterized this case by finding that it is the Appellant who would 
be unjustly enriched because it failed to acknowledge the unjust benefits the Respondents 
received to the detriment of the Appellant: 
1. An interest free mortgage for six years, 1 month and 18 days 
(7/27/09 to 9/14/15). ($101,500.00 x .10%) Value= $62,290.37. 
A rent/mortgage free residence for 4 years, 7 months and 18 days 
(10/27/09 to 6/1/14). 
3. Income from rent on said residence 1 year, 3 months 
(6/01/2014 to 9/14/15). ($900.00 x 13 months) Value= $11,700.00. 
It is not inequitable, nor is the Appellant unjustly enriched, by the improvements made by 
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undertaken 
Respondents own financial benefit, and not for the benefit of the Appellant (Brown v. 
Club of Coeur d'Alene Ltd., 111 Idaho 195, 199, 722 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Ct. App.1986)). 
Respondent Gennieve Hill, when asked about the terms of the "loan" from her daughter, 
testified: "The terms of that were that I would borrow the money and I would fix up the property 
because it was a dilapidated property, and then I would pay her back" (Tr Vol. 1, p. 59, L. 17-
20). Indeed, the district court found, "The repairs and improvements increased the value of the 
property" (R Vol. 1, p. 77, L. 26). 
Furthermore, the Appellant is entitled to any increase in the value of the property: " ... a 
constructive trust is essentially a tracing remedy, allowing recovery of the specific asset or assets 
taken from the plaintiff, any property substituted for it, and any gain in its value". 1 Dobbs, Law 
of Remedies§ 4.3(1), pp. 588-89. According to the evidence submitted at trial, $27,066.05 of 
the Respondent's claimed $33,689.08 worth of improvements were incurred after the California 
Case trial on March 24, 2011 (Defendants Trial Exhibit 501). Inequitably, though the district 
court found that "The improvements were completed in approximately May of 2012" (R Vol. 1, 
p. 78, L. 4 ), the district court, nonetheless, ordered the Appellant to reimburse the Respondents 
for expenses through July 23, 2013 (Defendants Trial Exhibit 501). 
2. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY BOTH FINDING 
THAT THE TRANSFER OF THE $101,500.00 FROM MS. CORREA TO 
THE RESPONDENTS WAS A LOAN AND IN DETERMINING THAT 
SAID LOAN WOULD BE RECOVERABLE BY THE APPELLANT 
UNDER ITS TERMS. 
Respondents did not district court with 
the $101,500.00 by Ms. Correa to the Respondents was a loan, yet the district court deterrmrted it 
to be a loan, not a gift. The district court stated: "The characterization of the transfer of 
$101,500.00 is disputed. Plaintiff characterizes the transfer as a gift and done without 
consideration. Defendants characterize the transfer as a loan. The Court finds the transfer was a 
loan, not a gift. At the time the money was transferred, it was intended that the money would be 
repaid to Ms. Correa at some point. The Court infers from the circumstances that the loan, like 
many transactions between parents and children, was vague or uncertain in many of its terms. 
There was no stated interest rate and no exact due date. The loan was to be repaid upon resale of 
the house" (R Vol. 1, p. 76-77, L. 27-28 and 1-2). 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HA VE LOOKED TO CALIFORNIA 
LAW TO DETERMINE IF THE TRANSFER WAS A LOAN OR A GIFT 
The district court did not explain how it came to this conclusion. It is unclear which law 
the district court used to determine that the transfer was a loan. Rungee v. Allied Van Lines, 
lnc.,_92 Idaho 718, 722-23, 449 P.2d 378, 382-83 (1968), 
contract are 
contacts to account 
I -
matter (e) the domicile, residence, nationality, 
place of incorporation and place of business of the parties. (Sword v. Sweet 92 P.3d 492 (2004) 
140 Idaho 242). 
All of these contacts took place in the State of California; therefore, the district court 
should have looked to the laws of the State of California to determine whether or not a valid 
"mortgage" had been created. "A mortgage can be created, renewed, or extended, only by 
writing, executed with the formalities required in the case of a grant of real property" (California 
Civil Code Section 2922). Respondent Gennieve Hill further testified, when asked if she had 
" ... any written documentation regarding a debt owed to Ms. Correa by you": "No" (Tr Vol. 1 p. 
115, L. 8-11). The district court erred by not applying California law in its determination that the 
money transferred by Ms. Correa to the Respondents was a loan. 
B. THE APPELLANT COULD NOT RECOVER THE "LOAN" BECAUSE IT 
WAS NOT DISCLOSED IN MS. CORREA'S BANKRUPTCY 
The district court went on to state: "The loan from Ms. Correa to Defendants Hill is an 
asset traceable to the trust and the loan is recoverable by the Plaintiff under its terms the same as 
though Ms. Correa had deposited funds with a lender or brokerage company. I.e., Plaintiff 
could have elected to simply enforce the loan" (R Vol. 1, p. 79, L. 2-5). Such a recovery, by the 
Appellant, however, would be impossible. Had Ms. Correa's transfer of the $101,500.00 to the 
Respondents actually been a loan, because Ms. Correa did not list it as an asset in her Chapter 7 
Bankruptcy, the Appellant's rights to the "loan" would have been cut off. In A!callister v. Dixon, 
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154 Idaho 891, the Idaho Supreme Court pronounced, "Property 
disclosed on the asset schedule, or otherwise administered by the time the bankruptcy case 
not 
closes, remains property of the bankruptcy estate forever." An-Tze Cheng v. K & S Diversified 
Investments, Inc., 308 B.R. 448,461 (9th Cir. BAP 2004); U.S. ex rel. Gebert v. Trans. Admin. 
Serv., 260 F.3d 909, 913 (8th Cir.2001). The Plaintiff would then be judicially estopped from 
attempting to enforce the "loan" as it would have become the property of the bankruptcy estate. 
Furthermore, because there is no documentation of the loan, the Appellant would have no 
evidence of a debt to collect. 
3. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY EXCLUDING 
THE APPELLANT'S TRIAL EXHIBITS AS A SANCTION FOR 
DISCOVERY VIOLATIONS. 
Sanctions serve a dual purpose. They can be used to "punish misconduct and deter others 
involved in litigation to prevent abuse in connection with discovery ... " Devault, supra, 107 
Idaho at 2, 684 P.2d at 979. It is also equally true that sanctions can be used to encourage and aid 
in discovery. United States v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 617 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir.1980). 
At first blush, these twin aims may seem to be in conflict, but in reality are congruent. The trial 
judge should use the sanction power wisely and ultimately try to achieve the efficient 
administration of justice. He should not consider one aim more important than the other aim, but 
generally he should try to attempt to satisfy the aim of encouragement before applying the more 
drastic punishment sanction. 
The Appellant was served with the "Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories, Requests 
for Production of Documents and Requests for Admission Propounded to Plaintiff' on April 23, 
2015. Response by the Appellant was due on May 22, 2015 and trial was set for June 22, 2015. 
The instructions for the production of documents stated:" ... you are requested, within (30) days 
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date of this document was served upon you, to permit the inspection 
documents and things requested below at the offices of STEW ART TAYLOR & MORRIS 
PLLC, 12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100, Boise, Idaho 83713 or at such other time and place 
as the parties agree upon in writing. As an alternative to producing the documents for inspection 
and copying, accurate, legible and complete copies of requested documents may be attached to 
your responses and served within the same time period". 
The Appellant served his timely response on May 22, 2015. The Appellant completely 
answered all of the interrogatories and requests for admission. As for the document request, he 
answered: "The request is unreasonable as it requests that the plaintiff travel 540 miles (1,080 
miles round trip) to the defense attorney's office so that they may make copies of said 
documents. Furthermore, the request does not " ... describe each item and category with 
reasonable particularity" (IRCP 34(b)(1)). The defense is permitted to make copies of any 
documents, provided that any/all copies will be made in Fair Oaks, California". 
At no point between the discovery request on April 23, 2015 and the trial on June 
2015 did the Respondents object to the Appellant's responses, nor did they file a motion to 
compel. It was not until the start of the trial that the Respondents objected to the Appellant's 
answer to their document request (Tr Vol. 1, p. 17, L. 3-9). At no time, from the date they 
received the Appellant's responses (May 22, 2015) until the morning of trial (June 
the Respondents contact the Appellant regarding the document request. 
Appellant 
1 
22 
not 
2015), did 
court 
Appellant as 
the 
to the Appellants motions this case. 
court 
to 
Henderson v. Cominco American, Inc., 95 Idaho 690, 696, 518 P.2d 873, 879 (1973). 
Astorquia, 113 Idaho at 532, 746 P. 2d at 990. court 
a case on 
was no to 
of court. 
4. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY GIVING THE 
APPELLANT ONLY 180 DAYS FROM ENTRY OF JUDGMENT TO 
SATISFY THE EQUITABLE LIEN 
The district court awarded the Appellant title to the 419 N. 19th Street property; it 
awarded the Respondent's an equitable lien on the same property in the amount of $33,689.08 (R 
pg. 80). However, the district court allowed the Appellant only "180 days from of 
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judgment to satisfy this equitable lien. After that date, Defendant's 
to foreclose their lien". The Respondents, however, held the Appellant's property from July 
2009 until judgment was entered on September 14, 2015- a period of 2,240 days or 6 years, 1 
month and 18 days. The equitable lien granted by the district court inequitably gives the 
innocent Appellant only 1/12 of the time to pay off this court appointed lien as the Respondents 
were given to return the Appellant's property, without compensating the Appellant for the 
retention of his property. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Appellant Antranick Harrentsian respectfully requests 
that this Court amend the district courts imposition of the equitable lien, in favor of the 
Defendants, against the 419 N. 19th Street property. Appellant asks the Court to either eliminate 
the lien all together, or reduce the lien to $6,623.03, which represents the Defendants 
expenditures for improvements on the subject property prior to the California Case trial on 
March 24, 2011 ($33,689.08 total $27,066.05 expenses occurring after the California Case 
trial). Appellant requests that, if a lien remains upon the property, that he be given the one full 
year to pay, per Idaho Code 6-416. Finally, Appellant requests that he be reimbursed for his 
costs on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of December, 2015. 
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R NICK HARRENTSIAN 
IN PROPIA PERSONA 
